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Abstract It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to
remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental
premise, ‘that all humans are one another’s equals’. One single concept of ‘basic
equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political
thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all
humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There
are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand
unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these
concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each indi-
vidual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under
the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in them-
selves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation
stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near
impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority
will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to
justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest
and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our
attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between
the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that
political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are
equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are
equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else).
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‘That all human beings are one another’s equals’ is often taken to be our shared
starting point—the first article of constitutions; the indignant riposte of the
oppressed; the cry of revolutionaries; the bland motherhood of politicians—the
common basic premise of all contemporary political thought.1
This claim of ‘basic equality’ amongst human beings is supposed to be distinct
from two other claims. First, it is intended to be distinct from the much more
controversial claim of distributional equality. Our basic equality denotes some
natural, inalienable property that we have to the same degree. Distributional
equality, by contrast, is the further claim that, in virtue of such basic equality, we
should be distributed equal shares of something, whether that be resources,
opportunity, happiness or anything else. Basic equality, therefore, is something to be
recognised and respected. Distributional equality is something to fail or succeed in
achieving.2
Secondly, basic equality is also intended to be distinct from its own basis. Basic
equality denotes a normative property, that is, the same level of some value, good or
reason for action. The basis of basic equality, by contrast, is the non-normative
property in virtue of which we have this normative property; whether it be our
shared rational capacity, humanity, empathy, having been made in the image of God
or whatever else. It is the metaphysical basis of our basic equality. However, we
also expect it to play an epistemological role, that is, we expect to identify those
who instantiate basic equality in this world by identifying who shares its basis.3
According to this picture, within contemporary political thought, therefore, we
disagree bitterly about whether basic equality entails distributional equality, and if
so what precisely is to be distributed. We also disagree about how to solve the
difficult problem of what is the basis of our basic equality, if we believe it to be
soluble at all. However, we all agree that all human beings are one another’s equals.
This agreement forges the unity of contemporary political thought. It is the shared
egalitarian plateau from whence all other arguments begin.4
In this paper, I shall argue that this unity is false. Our political thought is, in fact,
deeply divided between at least two very different concepts of basic equality. They
1 Pojman and Westmoreland (1997), 1: ‘It is one of the basic tenets of almost all contemporary moral and
political theories that all humans are essentially equal, of equal worth, and should have this ideal reflected
in the economic, social, and political structures of society.’ See also Wasserstrom (1971), 115; Dworkin
(1977), 272–273; (1985), 191; (2000), 11; Kymlicka (2002), 4; Pojman (1992), 605; Scanlon (2004), 2;
Dahl (2006), 4; Sen (2009), 291; Smith (2011), 1; Carter (2011), 540.
2 For the classic debate on distributional egalitarianism, see Dworkin (1981b), c), Arneson (1989), Cohen
(1989), Sen (1992), Roemer (1996), Anderson (1999).
3 For key papers on the basis of basic equality, see Spiegelberg (1944), Berlin (1956), Bedau (1967),
Benn (1967), Rawls (1971), 504–512, Williams (1973), Llyod Thomas (1979), Vlastos (1984), Arneson
(1998), Waldron (2008), Carter (2011). It is true that some of these authors do not draw this tripartite
structure. Instead, they only describe two elements: distributional equality as a prescription that applies to
a set of individuals, and the ‘basic equality’ as the descriptive property in virtue of which one is a member
of that set of individuals. Nothing I say here rejects this way of understanding basic equality, I just
consider it to involve further alternative concepts, see n. 6.
4 Kymlicka (2002), 5.
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denote two very different meanings within the claim ‘That all human beings are one
another’s equals’. And, whilst they are not in themselves logically inconsistent, they
indicate two very different starting points for political thought. I shall call these
concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. Differentiating these two concepts
helps us clarify the original source of many of our disagreements, currently
obscured by the false fancy that, in the end, at least we all start from the same one
common fundamental premise.5
Finally, to draw upon the obvious inspiration for this paper, as Berlin discusses
two concepts of liberty, I do not pretend that there are not more concepts of basic
equality. Instead, merely, ‘I propose to examine no more than two of these senses—
but those central ones, with a great deal of human history behind them, and, I dare
say still to come.’6
Equal Worth
The first concept of basic equality I shall call Equal Worth: each individual’s good
is of equal moral significance. It is a concept variously expressed throughout
political thought, not only as ‘equal worth’ itself,7 but also as ‘equal consideration’,
‘matter[ing] equally’,8 ‘equal intrinsic weight’,9 ‘equal value’, ‘the equal primary
importance of everyone’s life’,10 being worthy of ‘equal concern’11 and other
formulations.12 However, since the idea of ‘someone’s individual good’ itself is
equivocal, Equal Worth is best understood as coming under two different
conceptions.
One the one hand, there is the claim that all human beings—their bodies, minds
and/or souls—are of equal value.13 This is to claim that we have the kind of value
we might attribute to a precious artwork, or a natural environment, or a sacred ritual.
We are valuable things to be cherished, nourished and respected. We have value in-
5 Whilst I cannot find any other author who has drawn this distinction nor its implications, it is prefigured
in a few places. See, Amy Gutman’s distinction between ‘Equal Passions’ and ’Equal Rationality’
(Gutmann 1980, ch. 1), although this distinction appears to substitute the question of the basis of basic
equality and the concept of basic equality itself; and, Ian Carter’s distinction between basic equality
regulating relations between individuals, and that regulating relations between the state and the individual
(Carter 2013).
6 Berlin (1969), 121.
7 Pojman (1997); Vlastos (1984), 43ff; Dahl (2006), 4. It is often also the assumption of its opponents:
Kekes (1990), 106ff.
8 Kymlicka (2002), 3–4.
9 Haksar (2003), 96; Haksar (1979), 17.
10 Nagel (1991), 131.
11 Dworkin (2000), 128. See also, ‘In Defense of Equality’ (1983), 24.
12 For example, Jeremy Waldron who states that to claim that ‘all humans are equals’ is to claim that:
‘[M]oral argument (including arguments purporting to justify discrimination) ranges over the good of all
human beings, without any fundamental division or differentiation’ Waldron (2008), 9. See also, Benn
(1967), 62; Lukes (1977), 98; Hurka (1993), 161; Pettit (2012), 78–79.
13 I attribute this conception to Pojman (1997); Kekes (1990), 106ff.
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and-of-ourselves, and that value is not for the sake of anyone else, not even
ourselves. If it is for anyone, it is for God alone.
On the other hand, there is the claim that the fundamental good for each human
being—our utility, happiness, welfare, interests or some other cognate—is of equal
weight.14 This is to claim that in the ultimate moral calculus, when tasked with
promoting the good in general, promoting the good for each individual is of equal
moral significance. Equal weight, therefore, is a function that maps the value of
things for any individual (their individual good) to that which is valuable in-and-of-
itself (the good in general).
The conception of Equal Worth qua equal value stretches back at least as far as
early Christian thought.15 Being made in the image of God, we are all, equally,
sacred objects.16 Our souls are of equal value, but not for our own sake. They are of
value either in themselves or, if for anyone, for God. This value persists, no matter
what the contingencies of life. Further, as a corollary of our value, our actions are of
equal significance. Our actions, both good and bad, are to be judged on the same
cosmic scales.
In part, this picture is a call to human action; to proselytise and save every human
soul for the sake of redemption; to promote good actions, and diminish the bad for
the sake of God. However, it also an excuse for inaction. For if every soul has equal
value, regardless of the vagaries of human existence, and if the actions of each soul
are to be weighed equally no matter their position, then so long as actions performed
under more difficult circumstances are valued more highly than those made under
easy circumstances, God’s cosmic scales provide all the moral balance required in
this life and the next. So long as it is harder for a rich man to enter into Heaven than
for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle,17 we can leave distributional justice
to God.
This picture is also consistent with a world in which each person has her place.
Our souls have equal value, but their purpose is to serve God in different ways,
whether as a peasant, merchant, priest or king. This impersonal organic system is
easily at hand when our own (equal) value, is not for ourselves, but for God.18 So it
is coherent that our individual value for God is only realised via our individual value
as a part of a society.
14 I attribute this conception to Waldron (2008), Kymlicka (2002), Dworkin (1983, 2000), Arneson
(1998), Nagel (1991), Haksar (2003), Vlastos (1984), Benn (1967), Lukes (1977), Hurka (1993), Pettit
(2012).
15 ‘[I]t was only the Church which enriched mankind with this state of distress!—‘‘Equality of souls
before God’’, this falsehood, this pretext for the rancune of all base-minded, this explosive concept which
finally became revolution, modern idea and the principle decline of the entire social order—is Christian
dynamite.’ Nietzsche (1968), ch. 62, 186. Goodman (1976) argues that the doctrine is foreshadowed in
the Old Testament, for example, Malachi 2:10. See also, Morgan (1943), 115; Spiegelberg (1944), 101;
Pojman (1991), 496. For a contrasting position, where theology grounds inequality as Unequal Value one
might look at the Mahabharata, where individuals are born into the world as unequals because of
differences in their purity or evil, picked upon in previous lives. See, Somjee (1967), 187.
16 Genesis 1:27.
17 Matthew 19:24.




What is not central to this whole picture, however, is our own individual good,
that is, what is valuable for our own sake. Our soul’s value, and that of our
actions, is for the sake of God, and perhaps intermediately for our society. Our
own individual good is unnecessary for this picture, and perhaps this is why, its
earthly form is so easily reducible to non-normative desires, pleasures and
passions, that can be cast as valueless, animalistic temptations; mere obstacles to
serving the greater good of God.19 All that is left of what is genuinely valuable for
our own sake, then, is our own individual good after life. Conveniently, this post-
death individual good plays a supporting role, reinforcing the rest of the organic
system. It only arises as a reward for realising the greater good of God, in the
form of redemption in Heaven. It follows that whilst the equal weight of our
individual good is consistent with this system, and a natural corollary of equal
value, it is relegated along with our individual good to a peripheral, supporting
role.
The death of God precipitates the collapse of this system.20 Once the service of
God ceases to define the good in general, our own individual good makes a move to
the heart of our modern moral picture. As humanism reaches its apotheosis in
utilitarianism, the good in general becomes entirely defined as a promotion of
people’s individual good. And as this shift occurs, so does equal weight replace
equal value as the central sense in which we have Equal Worth.
In this utilitarian picture, equal value entirely disappears since only what is
valuable for our own sake constitutes the good in general. However, equal weight
becomes indispensable. As Mill states, ‘That principle [the utilitarian maxim] is a
mere form of words without rational significance, unless one person’s happiness
supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted
exactly as much as another’s’.21 Thus, ‘each to count for one, nobody for more than
one.’22 Or as more expressly stated by Bentham: ‘the happiness of the most helpless
pauper constitutes as large a portion of the universal happiness as that of the most
opulent members of the community’.23
With this new fundamental status, equal weight also becomes the object of
sustained attack by the forerunners and contemporaries of classical utilitarianism.
Keeping all the other key premises of utilitarianism intact, these thinkers reject
equal in favour of unequal weight. The world is full of unequals of Unequal Worth,
19 As Morgan (1943), 115, suggests the equal value of our soul in the eyes of God may well be
modernistic gloss for ‘Equally sinful’. See also, Ruskin (2007), vol. II, 159, [ch IV, §x]. Rosen remarks on
this equivocation in Christian thought: Rosen (2012), 14.
20 Nietzsche (1974), s 125.
21 Mill (1910), 58.
22 As Waldron notes, it is ‘surprisingly difficult to find a source for the Benthamite slogan’; it is really
only known by its quotation by Mill (1910), 58: Waldron (2008) 10, fn 26.
23 Bentham (1983), 107. For its usage in contemporary utilitarian thought see: Hare (1981), 26, who casts
the fundamental principle as ‘giving equal weight to the equal interests of all the parties’; Harsanyi
(1982), 47: similarly states that utilitarianism seeks to ‘always assign the same weight to all individuals’
interests’. See also, Dworkin (1981a), 201, and Sen (1992), 14.
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depending upon their ‘dignity or moral importance’, their ‘race’, or ‘higher or lower
capacities’.24
However, the history of political thought bears out the result. And, whilst we may
still utilise the concept of Unequal Worth as unequal weight to describe the
fundamental difference between us and other lesser animals,25 there appears to be an
almost global assumption that we all have Equal Worth in the sense of equal weight.
There is still conceptual space within this dominant current system for equal
value. However, it now takes on the peripheral role. It may be cast as the source or
consequence of the equal weight of our individual good, but either way it is not the
operational focus. The aim of this moral system, and its political extensions, is some
promotion and distribution of individual good. And regardless of whether this is a
utilitarian, egalitarian, sufficientarian, prioritarian or whatever else distribution, the
individual good of each person is to be accorded equal weight.26
Equal Authority
Equal value and equal weight are different. However, I cast them loosely as two
different conceptions of the one concept because of their close relationship. They
are both claims about the nature of the good, and our place within it. One is easily
cast as the corollary of the other. And so long as moral and political philosophy is
concerned with the promotion and distribution of the good, whatever it is, Equal
Worth under some conception is bound to play a foundational role.
However, to borrow Berlin’s opening line, ‘If men never disagreed about the
ends of life, if our ancestors had remained undisturbed in the Garden of Eden, the
studies to which the Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory is dedicated
24 ‘In comparing the moral qualities of actions … we are led by our moral sense of virtue to judge thus;
that in equal degrees of happiness, expected to proceed from the action, the virtue is in proportion to the
number of persons to whom the happiness shall extend (and here the dignity, or moral importance of
persons, may compensate numbers)’ Hutcheson (1725), 283–284; individuals, or races, with higher
capacities (i.e. capacities for a higher sort of well-being) have a right to more than merely equal
consideration as compared to those of lower capacities. Hence the formula, ‘Everyone to count for one,
nobody for more than one’, must be interpreted to mean ‘everyone’s good to count for as much as the like
good of any one else.’ Rashdall (1924), 238.
25 See, Waldron (2008), 9; Haksar (1979), 65–66; contra Singer (1977), 22.
26 It might be pressed at this point, that upon closer inspection prioritarianism must, by definition, reject
basic equality as equal value. This is because, ‘Prioritarianism holds that the moral value of achieving a
benefit for an individual (or avoiding a loss) is greater… the lower the person’s level of well-being over
the course of her life apart from receipt of this benefit. Arneson (2013) [Emphasis added]. Parfit (1997),
‘The Priority View: [is defined as] Benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are’, 213.
Accordingly, given two individuals with different absolute levels of individual good, on the priority
view, one extra ‘unit’ of individual good arising in the individual with less total individual good is more
morally valuable than one extra ‘unit’ arising in the individual with more total individual good. (See, a
similar point made regarding minimax theories, Hurka (1993), 161.) There is, however, no need to take
this ‘per unit’ view to be the best interpretation of what it means to hold that the ‘individual good of each
individual is of equal value’. A better interpretation might simply be that the total individual good of any
individual is as morally valuable as the same total individual good in any other. This, arguably, was Mill’s
understanding of basic equality: ‘It may be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts of
happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons.’ Mill (1910), 58.
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could scarcely have been conceived.’27 Much political philosophy is concerned, first
and foremost, not with the promotion and distribution of the good, but with our
disagreement about it. With such disagreement arises questions of authority—
epistemic and practical; and hence, a different domain for basic equality.
We all have different epistemic capacities including, it would seem, in the
domain of the normative. Some know better than others what we should do and
why. For much of human history, this unequal epistemic authority has been thought
to justify a form of basic inequality: unequal practical authority.
For Plato and Aristotle, it was obvious that those who knew best the ends of life
were unequals to the rest.28 They were vested with fundamental authority over
others. By authority, I mean practical, de jure authority, that is, ‘the right to rule’.
Such a right can be understood, using contemporary terminology, as the ability to
create a decisive reason for an individual to act by determining that she should so
act.29 By ‘fundamental’, I mean that such authority is not derived from some
previous exercise of authority between the relevant individuals. It is not the product
of delegation, or abdication, authorisation, agency or consent.
Whilst putative relations of epistemic superiority and inferiority have often been
taken to ground such basic inequality as Unequal Authority between individuals, the
history of political thought bears out a range of other bases too—sometimes as loose
proxies for epistemic authority,30 other times tracing persons’ roles in God’s
inexplicable organic system, other times thinly covering bald assertions of power. In
this way, Unequal Authority has been grounded by differences in race, sex, class,
education,31 property, age, ‘virtues and talents’,32 and patrilineality,33 to name a
few.
In some societies, these bases ground great chains of being, a natural hierarchy
from God, down the archangels and angels, through kings and bishops, the other
classes to the lowliest peasant, and sometimes beyond.34 Here fundamental
authority is exhaustive and transitive all the way down. In other societies, however,
the multiplicity of bases ground a confusing system, which threatens to be
inconsistent and incoherent. The fundamental authority of an upper-class, rich,
27 Berlin (1969), ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’.
28 Plato (1892), 56ff [II, 375ff]; Aristotle (1976), 174 [1131a20–1].
29 Broadly speaking I am willing to accept Joseph Raz’s analysis of how such reason comes to be
decisive, that is, by being the systematic combination of two reasons. First, a reason to act as directed; and
secondly, an ‘exclusionary’ reason, not to act on the basis of otherwise valid reasons to act to the contrary
(Raz (1975); repr., (1999), 39–84; 189–191; Green (2010), 225; Raz (2010), 282; 290–291). In this way,
the reason created by the command is not added and weighed against other reasons, but simply overrides
them. Raz calls such reasons, ‘protected’ or ‘pre-emptive’ (Raz 1986, 59).
30 Eg., Locke’s somewhat ad hoc justification for a husband’s authority over his wife: Locke (2003), 135.
31 Eg., Mill’s On Representative Government, ch. VIII, in Mill (1910).
32 Eg., Thomas Jefferson argued for a ‘natural aristocracy’ based upon ‘virtues and talents’. He supported
democracy, therefore, not as a form of equal fundamental authority (see below) but as the most effective
instrument to identify the natural aristocracy. See, ‘Jefferson to Adams 28 Oct. 1813’ in Cappon (1959),
2:387–392. See also, Santayana (1905), 109ff.
33 Eg., Filmer (1685).
34 Lovejoy (1953).
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uneducated, white male relative to all others may be easy to define; but perhaps not
so an upper-class, poor, educated, black female. The proper distribution of
fundamental authority is a difficult task in this society, best left to the finest
theological, legal and philosophical minds of their generation.
It is within such hierarchical societies, however, that a different concept of Basic
Equality is forged. Whilst these societies as a whole define sets of unequals, they
also define sub-sets of equals. These are individuals of the ‘same species and
rank’.35 Individuals who may, respectively have superiors or inferiors, yet with
respect to one another have equal fundamental authority. Basic Equality as Equal
Authority, therefore, is a concept most easily first grasped from within the
framework of an unequal society. Once understood, however, the radical move is,
even gradually, to extend its predication to the entire set of moral agents.
Like Equal Worth, the claim that all individuals are equals in this sense of having
Equal Authority has a multitude of different expressions (equal authority, power,
sovereignty, dignity, command, right, dominion, jurisdiction)36 that can be grouped
under two different conceptions.
On the one hand, there is the claim that all individuals have equal fundamental
authority over all. We might dub this the ‘democratic conception’. Under this
conception, all individuals have an equal right to determine the laws that will apply
to all, including themselves; and this right is realised via some procedure—direct
voting, participatory fora, representative elections, majority ballot, and/or consensus
decision making.
On the other hand, there is the claim that each individual has fundamental
authority over herself and only herself. We might call this the ‘liberal conception’.
This conception has two components. First, it has a negative clause: no individual
has fundamental authority over any other individual. No one is anyone else’s
master, no one is anyone else’s subject. Secondly, it has a positive clause: each
individual has fundamental authority over herself. Each individual is both her own
master and her own subject. It follows that the ‘liberal conception’ of Equal
Authority, also implies a parallel concept of ‘basic freedom’ also composed of two
clauses, that is, first, a freedom from the fundamental authority of anyone else; and,
secondly, a freedom to exercise fundamental authority over oneself.37 Hence, the
common, often unanalysed, dyad ‘all humans are free and equal.’38
Fundamental authority ‘over oneself’ may at first appear to be a somewhat
contorted extension of the concept of authority.39 However, in this context, it means
nothing more than one having ability to give oneself a decisive reason to act by
35 Locke (2003), II.II.4.
36 John Liliburne names virtually all of them in his claim that: ‘All and every particular and individual
man and woman… are and were, by nature all equal and alike in power, dignity, authority, and majesty,
none of them having by nature any authority, dominion, or magisterial power one over or above another’
Lilburne (1938), 317–318.
37 Freedom from authority is somewhat surprisingly absent from discussions of the various concepts and
conceptions of liberty, presumably because it involves the absence of normative interference rather than
physical interference. See, Berlin, (1969), ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’.
38 See, Macedo (1990), 36–37; Waldron (1993); Quong (2010), 2–3.
39 See, Raz (1979), 18.
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determining that one so should act. The most obvious examples include promises
and contracts. However, I also take it to include a principle of conscience, that is,
where one gives oneself a new decisive reason to act upon one’s own conviction by
coming to believe in that conviction, even if the independent grounds for that
conviction ultimately turn out to be false.40
The democratic conception of Equal Authority emerges with democracy itself,
amongst the small city-state republics of Greece, only to largely disappear until the
emergence of the similar small city-state republics of the Renaissance.41 This is
perhaps no great coincidence, since the democratic conception ultimately does more
to legitimise the fundamental authority of the community, rather than that of the
individual. This is because, whilst each individual is indeed an equal with the same
right to rule over all others, that right is impotent when compared with the aggregate
right of all others. Quiet rightly, the democratic conception allows each individual
to conceive of themselves as equal members, as equal citizens of their communities.
However, that membership is primarily as a subject rather than as a ruler.
For this reason, the so-called ‘Liberty of the Ancients’ is a misrepresentation.42
There is no great freedom ensured by the democratic conception. At best one is free
from the superior fundamental authority of any other individual. However, this is
easily replaced by the tyranny of the majority. The democratic conception only
entails ‘self-governance’, therefore, if the self is identified with the community as a
whole.43
It is for this reason that the democratic conception comes under great pressure as
the community grows and diversifies.44 The mental gymnastics required to convince
oneself that one is governing oneself, by being governed by the majority become
harder as one is less likely to have anything in common with the majority. In
particular, as society grows to include a multiplicity of different conceptions of the
good, one can no longer identify a common set of values that could define the
communal self. Competing epistemic authorities begin to undermine the democratic
conception of equal practical authority.
The liberal conception, by contrast, emerges from the internal fracturing of the
powers—spiritual and temporal—that held together the larger kingdoms and
empires from the Middle Ages well into the Renaissance. Up until this point, the
Catholic Church retained supreme and unquestioned epistemic authority, and in turn
verified that God had willed the unequal fundamental practical authority of the
monarchical regimes.45
40 See, Gaus (2015), 136–156.
41 Although note the many other origins of democracy in Africa, amongst the Vikings, and other souces:
Isakhan and Stockwell (2011).
42 Constant (1988), 323.
43 See, Sabine (1937), 30; Mill (1910), 67–68.
44 Wollheim (1962), 72.
45 As David Held states, the ‘Christian world-view transformed the rationale of political action from that
of the polis to a theological framework’, such that the notion of ‘good’ lay in submission to God’s will.
Thus, ‘how the will of God was to be interpreted and articulated with systems of secular power
preoccupied Christian Europe for centuries, until the very notion of single religious truth was shattered by
the Reformation.’ Held (1996), 37.
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Yet, ‘things fall apart’.46 The Great Schism cleaved the Church in two. The
remaining Western, Catholic Church continuously tussled for power with the very
Holy Roman Empire that it had anointed. The Reformation split what remained of
the Catholic Church’s authority into competing Protestant sects, many of whom did
not even claim epistemic authority for their own clergy, but instead placed their
congregation in direct communion with God. The English gentry precipitated the
Civil War as they aimed to assert the authority of Parliament over Charles I.
These crises reshaped the relationship between contemporary epistemic and
practical authority structures. Where previously one could presume a shared belief
in who knew best the will of God (the Church), and thus who knew who God had
willed to govern (the Monarch); now, one could not presume such a shared belief.
Some saw, in this new situation, the operation of defective reasoning by those who
disagreed. They had somehow been corrupted. This justified war, oppression and
even the establishment of new isolated societies to purify and restore homogeneity
of belief.47
Others, however, made a novel conceptual move. They realised that God himself
must have given all human beings their reasoning capacity, and expected them to
act upon it. If this was God’s will, then the starting point of any holy action was to
follow one’s own reasoned beliefs. One’s God-given capacity to be one’s own
epistemic authority thus grounded one’s own fundamental practical authority over
oneself, and oneself alone. And, since all individuals had this capacity, all
individuals must be equals in having such fundamental authority: ‘Every man by
nature being a king, priest prophet, in his own natural circuit and compass, whereof
no second may partake but by deputation, commission, and free consent from him
whose right it is.’48
Given this new liberal conception of Equal Authority, the authority of the state
could still be justified but only derivatively. It must derive from the fundamental
authority of all individuals, exercised via their consent, authorisation, agreement or
social contract. As the fifteenth century cardinal, Nicholas of Cusa stated, when
advocating reform of the Holy Roman Empire:
For if by nature men are equally powerful and equally free, the valid and
ordained authority of one man naturally equal in power with the others cannot
be established except by the choice and consent of the others, even as law also
is established by consent.49
This liberal conception of Equal Authority can be traced most prominently
through all the key figures of social contract theory.50 It is the foundation of
Hobbes’s claim that only by our own consent and authorisation can we come under
46 Achebe (2006), citing W. B. Yeats, ‘The Second Coming’ in Yeats (1992).
47 After all, this is the original aim of those pilgrims going to Northern Ireland and America.
48 The Leveller, Richard Overton in his ’An Arrow Against All Tyrants’ cited in Woodhouse (1951);
Nozick (1974). For other Leveller references to Equal Authority cited in Woodhouse’s collection see John
Lilburne at 317 and Richard Rain borough at 53.
49 Nicholas of Cusa (1954), II.14.
50 It also runs through anarchist thought, eg. Wolff (1970).
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any duty to obey the sovereign, even if he does not explicitly articulate it as a
concept of basic equality.51 It is the most important part of Pufendorf’s
heterogeneous concept of basic equality.52 It emerges fully recognised as the basic
meaning of the claim ‘that all human beings are equal’ in Locke:
‘That all men by nature are equal,’ I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts
of equality… [instead, I mean] the equality which all men are in, in respect of
jurisdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality I there
spoke of, as the proper business in hand, being that equal right every man hath
to his natural freedom, without being subject to the will or authority of any
other man.53
Unlike the value and weight conceptions of Equal Worth, the liberal and democratic
conceptions of Equal Authority are incompatible. This is because they both make
incompatible claims about the distribution of fundamental authority within a
society. Both cannot be true. However, one can ground the other, if the latter
becomes a claim about the distribution of derivative not fundamental authority. And
this is precisely what begins with Locke.54 The Lockean social contract based upon
the liberal conception grounds the derivative (proto-)democratic authority of
Parliament.
In this way, for the first time, we get the logical space for liberal, democratic
constitutionalism. The democratic conception as a theory of fundamental authority
is actually antithetical to a constitution that purports to limit the ongoing
fundamental authority of the citizens to rule by majority over themselves on any
matter, particularly insofar as it seeks to protect individual and minority rights.55
After all, what greater authority can a constitution have over the combined
fundamental authority of the majority?
However, starting one’s theory with the liberal conception instead, a constitution
can be secured with more fundamental legitimacy over and above the even more
derivative standing of the democratic system, since the latter is only grounded by
the former.
This (albeit unequal) marrying of the liberal and democratic conceptions reaches
its pinnacle in Rousseau. Each individual exercises her fundamental authority over
51 Hobbes (1962), 176. Whilst Hobbes grounds his social contract on the basic proposition and thus the
equal authority it contains, strictly speaking, it is not what he means when he calls human beings ‘equals’.
Instead, he denotes their physical capacities: ‘Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body
and mind’. This is to define basic equality by reference to the basis of equal authority, rather than equal
authority itself.
52 Pufendorf (1994), III.2.8: ‘[T]he actual establishment of sovereignty requires some antecedent human
deed, and a natural ability to rule by no means gives anyone sovereignty over those whom nature has
given a character fit for servitude. Nor does the fact that something is useful to another immediately allow
me to impose it on him by force. For men enjoy natural freedom to an equal degree, and they cannot allow
it to be diminished without their express, tacit, or interpretive consent, or without some other deed of
theirs by which others have acquired a right to seize it from them even against their will.’
53 Locke (2003), 54. See, Rousseau (2004), I.2.1; I.2.2–3; I. 9.8. And, Kant (1996), 4:432; Kant (1996),
6:238.
54 For the view that modern democratic theory begins with Locke not Rousseau, see Shapiro (2002), 309.
55 Note, Waldron (1999), ch. 11.
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herself to authorise the virtually absolute derivative authority of all individuals over
all, in the form of majoritarian direct democracy. Further, by grounding such a
classical vision of small city-state republican democracy on liberal foundations,
Rousseau can also reincorporate the classical identification with ‘community’ into
liberal, democratic constitutionalism.
This achievement, however, is obfuscated by Rousseau’s seemingly paradoxical
claims that by being an equal member within such a state whereby everyone rules
over everyone, one continues to be ruled only by oneself.56 One can, therefore, be
‘forced to be free’.57 These claims trade precision for rhetorical flourish,
equivocating between instances of fundamental and derivative authority. The
clearer, less pseudo-metaphysical claim is that within Rousseau’s state, every
individual is: free of the fundamental authority of any other; and, rules over oneself
by exercising one’s fundamental authority over oneself to ground the derivative
authority of the democratic decision making body. Thus, when this body
consequently rules derivatively over everyone, one continues to be ruled
fundamentally by oneself. And, when it enforces its rules against an individual, it
only forces that individual to obey the implications of her own previous exercise of
fundamental authority over herself.
Finally, with Kant, the role of the liberal conception expands beyond politics, to
ground all moral obligation:
If we look back upon all previous efforts that have ever been made to discover
the principle of morality, we need not wonder now why all of them had to fail.
It was seen that the human being is bound to laws by his duty, but it never
occurred to them that he is subject only to laws given by himself but still
universal and that he is bound only to act in conformity with his own will,
which, however, in accordance with nature’s end is a will giving universal
law.58
Of course, Kant does go on to state that the ‘lawgiving itself, which determines all
worth must for that very reason have a dignity [wu¨rde], that is, an uncondition,
incomparable worth [Werth].’59 He then notes that the ‘dignity’ of each human
being is, properly speaking, merely the dignity of this self-lawgiving capacity. Kant,
56 Rousseau (2004), I.6.4: ‘A form of association which will defend the person and goods of each
member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the
others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before.’ See also. Rousseau (2004), II.4.9.
57 Rousseau (2004), I.7.8.
58 Kant (1996), 4:432. An explicit statement of basic equality as equal authority follows in Kant’s
Doctrine of Right, whereby we all have ‘innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others
no more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master (sui
juris). Kant (1996), 6:238.
59 ‘For, nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for it. But the lawgiving itself,
which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional,
incomparable worth; and the word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that
a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every
rational nature’: Kant (1996), 4:436. Anderson (1999), 312 similarly refers to ‘Equal Worth; in a way that




therefore, is often taken to hold something akin to an Equal Worth concept, rather
than Equal Authority. There are a number of complications regarding the proper
translation of ‘wu¨rde’. However, we can put these aside. This is because, no matter
its meaning, if we follow Kant closely, each person’s authority over herself grounds
her wu¨rde; not vice versa. Kant argues for the proposition that one has authority
over oneself without any reference to wu¨rde, (or Werth or any possible claim about
the nature of the good). Further, once such authority is established, by definition, its
exercise gives one a decisive reason to follow the laws one gives oneself, and
excludes the authority of others. No reference to wu¨rde is required to establish this.
The fact that this capacity also happens, putatively, to have wu¨rde (whatever its
precise meaning) is just supervenient. It plays no role in justifying either one’s
authority over oneself or the binding quality of the duties it can create. In this way,
Equal Authority remains Kant’s most basic equality, even if he takes that basic
equality to ground a further, supervening and derivative ‘equality of wu¨rde’.
Basic Equalities in Contemporary Political Thought
The history of political philosophy offers up these two concepts of Basic Equality–
Equal Worth and Equal Authority (and their various conceptions)—to contemporary
thought. They are central to it.
On the one hand, we have a broad church of so-called ‘perfectionist’ or
‘comprehensive’ theories.60 All these theories, share the common claim that
political philosophy must begin with a conception of the good. We must make some
claim about the true ends of life. The state is, then, but a machine to achieve these
ends. And, its authority depends upon whether it is best able to ‘service’ those
ends.61 Most importantly, the state does not require the consent, implicit or
otherwise, of its subjects to have authority. Instead, that authority is fundamental
and arises because of the moral fact that individuals will best conform with their
true reasons for action by obeying it, rather than if they attempted to act on their
own. Central to this picture, therefore, is Basic Equality as Equal Worth under either
conception, but most prominently in the form of equal weight. As Ronald Dworkin
claims, there is a unity in their ‘abstract egalitarian principle’, that is, ‘government
must act to make the lives of those it governs better lives, and it must show equal
concern for the life of each.’62
On the other hand, there are the heirs of social contract theory: the political
liberals; the advocates of public reason; the purveyors of deliberative democracy (as
60 In this category, for example, I place: Raz (1986), Hurka (1993), Wall (1998), Arneson (2000), Haksar
(2003), Enoch (2012), and, I think a rather confused Dworkin (1983, 2000). See, Quong (2011) for the
distinction between perfectionist and comprehensive theories.
61 Raz (1986, 2006).
62 Dworkin (2000), 128. [Emphasis added]. ‘In Defense of Equality’, (1983), 24: Dworkin also states: ‘I
begin by setting out what I shall call the abstract egalitarian thesis. From the standpoint of politics, the
interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equally.’
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well as the philosophical anarchists and the rights-based libertarians).63 For these
philosophers, moral philosophising may begin with each individual’s attempt to
work out the true ends of life. However, political philosophy as an account of
legitimate authority and coercion only begins when we address the fact that these
individuals’ attempts will inevitably precipitate disagreement and conflict. Political
philosophy, therefore, must begin with a prior theory of fundamental authority
defined independent of any conception of the good, to adjudicate upon what to do
given our disagreement about the good. For these philosophers, generally the liberal
conception of Equal Authority is that prior theory of fundamental authority. As the
most recent prominent Rawlsian acolyte states: ‘We correctly think of ourselves as
free and equal from the moral point of view. We all have the same moral status as
free persons—as people who are not naturally under the authority of someone else.’64
In this way, the two concepts of Basic Equality mark a well-known fundamental
divide in contemporary political thought. In a way this seems obvious, but in fact it
has been far from obvious to those who have written on the topic of Basic Equality
itself. These philosophers have all tended to reach for a false unity. Most, in doing
so, have put forward Equal Worth as the concept common to all contemporary
political theories.65 The implicit assumption, it seems, being that those who
advocate Equal Authority must ultimately hold it to be grounded upon our Equal
Worth; the latter being logically prior to and justifying the former. However, this
picture simply flies in the face of the actual arguments that Hobbes, Pufendorf,
Locke and Kant make. None of these philosophers ever argue that our Equal Worth,
or anything like it, grounds our Equal Authority. This is despite the fact that the
former concept, in a Christianised form, was always a part of contemporary
thinking, and thus readily available for use as a premise. Instead, for Hobbes,
Pufendorf and Locke our Equal Authority arises as a function of God’s will: how he
made the world, whether we like it or not. And, for Kant it arises because of the
transcendental metaphysics of reason itself. Equal Worth does not come into it (or,
if anything, it comes as a consequence, as discussed above in Kant).
Today’s political liberals have no recourse to theology or transcendental
metaphysics to justify Equal Authority. Instead, they attempt to make epistemic
arguments. Or, they invent new sui generis ‘second personal reasons’. Or, they
verge upon relativism. Or, they take it to be an unquestionable premise of
contemporary culture. Or, they obviate between defeatist quietism and unhelpful
bald assertion. Clearly, the task is hard.66 However, they continue to pursue this
63 In this category, for example Rawls (1993), Larmore (2008), Nussbaum (2011), Quong (2011), I think
a rather confused Nagel (1987, 1991), Cohen (2009). On anarchism, see Buchanan (1978), 33; and for
rights-based libertarians, see Nozick (1974), and Steiner (1994).
64 Quong (2010), 3. See also, Estlund (2008), 120: ‘Another thing that is often meant by natural freedom
is that no person is born under the authority of anyone else. The authority of one person over another is, as
I have said, simply the moral power to require action. So this thesis of natural freedom is the claim that no
one is naturally subject to another’s commands in this way. The claim is not that there are no authority
relations at all, but only that none are owed to nature.’
65 See above, n. 1.




task, because they are purposefully avoiding making the claim that our equal
authority is justified because of our (equal) value as autonomous beings or the
(equal) weight of the value of autonomy for us. Such a justification is precisely the
kind of ‘comprehensive liberalism’ that political liberals explicitly reject.67 Political
liberals aim to avoid relying upon any premise about the nature of the good to
justify their theories, and thus a fortiori they avoid relying upon Equal Worth.
Political liberals, therefore, make no claim that our fundamental authority over
ourselves is necessarily good for us, or makes us good individuals. If anything it is a
cross to bear, a responsibility of being rational human beings with fallible
conceptions of the good. We may well live worse lives than if we were under the
supreme authority of an all-knowing, benevolent figure. However, our fundamental
authority remains as a constraining fact, for better or for worse.
Whilst political liberals must hold that Equal Authority is the most basic sense in
which we are equals, nothing about their position demands that they must reject
Equal Worth as false. They can accept the truth of Equal Worth, as much as any
other component of a true theory of individual good. However, just as with any
theory of the good in general, the truth of Equal Worth in particular, can only be
used to justify government authority on a basis that respects Equal Authority, not
vice versa. Accordingly, it is only our agreement about the truth of Equal Worth that
can make it a salient political principle, not its putative truth as a standalone fact.68
Political liberals, therefore, can quite comfortably assert the truth of both Equal
Authority and Equal Worth (although the use of the latter in justifying political
action is no longer ‘basic’). Perfectionists, by contrast, struggle to achieve the
inverse. If one seeks to ground one’s politics in a theory of the good (including
Equal Worth as a component), then one will only be able to justify Equal Authority
if autonomy is the ultimate and insuperable individual good. However, this is
generally taken to be implausible.69 As such, unlike the political liberals, the
perfectionists are pressed into acknowledging that, in a (not basic but still
important) sense all human beings are not equals. This is because some human
beings have greater fundamental authority to direct the state and its citizens towards
moral perfection than others. It is difficult for perfectionists, therefore, to prevent
sliding into systems of Unequal Authority such as epistocracy.
Having said this, of course, political liberals are in the difficult position of
dealing with citizens who will not consent to the social contract. These
‘unreasonable’ people risk being exiled outside the set of self-appointed equals.
Each side, therefore, has their own cross to bear. My point is only that we should
keep the distinction between those crosses clear, by keeping the difference between
67 For a clear discussion of why autonomy does not ground political liberalism see, Nussbaum (2011).
68 For this reason, it is not an argument against the basic-ness of the distinction between Equal Worth and
Equal Authority that political liberals often expect governments to act on the basis of some elements of a
conception of the good and application of the concept of Equal Worth to it (for example, assuming that in
general living longer is better than dying earlier, or developing the doctrine of ‘primary goods’). The
point is that these considerations can be validly relied upon not because they are true, but because they are
assumed to be so basic that every conception of the good will agree upon them.
69 Many, of course, believe that Kant makes this very mistake. This is understandable given the English
translation. Wolff (1970), for example, follows this interpretation to his detriment.
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the two concepts of Basic Equality in mind. It is no use for a political liberal, for
instance, to continue pointing out that perfectionists ‘fail to treat people as equals’,
and to take that to be a knock-down argument.70 Perfectionists can simply agree
with the political liberals that they do not treat people as equals in the Equal
Authority sense, because it is necessary inter alia to distribute resources effectively
in the Equal Worth sense. Instead, both perfectionists and political liberals need to
begin by arguing for which concept of equality is truly basic.
Other Putative Concepts
At this point, one might be beginning to wonder whether Equal Worth and Equal
Authority, whilst clearly different, may not be better understood as two conceptions
of some higher concept, some tertium quid. If this were true, then despite the
division between Equal Worth and Authority, we could still claim that there was a
grand unity in political thought, some shared starting point upon which all our
theories are built. As Dworkin and Kymlicka have hoped to claim, we are all
offering interpretations of the same single concept of basic equality. Or at least, we
are all constraining or judging our theories by the same moral implications drawn
from the same basic concept. If this were true, then we would have a common
framework within which to adjudicate between Equal Worth and Equal Authority.
However, all plausible, candidate, ‘more basic’ concepts fail. Their failures fall
into three categories.
First, some putative concepts are too thin. In fact, some fail to offer any concept
of equality at all. Thomas Scanlon, for example, suggests that basic equality means
to ‘count morally’.71 Or, as James Griffin states: ‘respecting persons equally is
looking at them from the moral point of view.’72 However, this position simply
confuses counting morally and being counting equally; being in moral view, and
being equals in moral view. Animals, slaves, gods, monarchs may all fall into the
former, but that certainly does not mean they all classify as the latter.73
Other concepts are also too thin because, whilst they offer a concept of equality,
they remain incomplete predicates. They fail to define the key dimension which we
are meant to be equals in. For example, take the concept of ‘equal status’.74 ‘Status’
in its minimal sense simply means having a relative position in some dimension. So
the claim that we all have ‘equal status’ simply means that we have equal relative
positions in some dimension. However, this is about as substantial a claim as telling
a blind person standing on the edge of the sidewalk that ‘A traffic light is some
colour’. Just as the blind person cannot even begin to determine the implications of
70 Eg., Nagel (1987), 223; Larmore (1996), 137; Nussbaum (2011), 44; Quong 96–107, 315.
71 Scanlon (2004), 2; Smith (2011), 6.
72 Griffin (1986), 163.
73 Formal equality conceptions are similarly too thin: see, Williams (1973), 230.
74 Stemplowska (2011), 355. Cupit (2000), 107. Cf., Sen (1992), 14. This same failing plagues ideas of
‘equal standing’ (Miller (2000) 231–232) and ‘equal recognition’ (Miller (2000), 231–232. See also,
Scanlon (2003), 204–205; cited, Wolff (2012), 7; White (1997), 13–14).
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the status of the traffic light without knowing which light is on, we cannot begin to
determine (interpret, argue, judge by, constrain with) the moral implications of the
equal status of human beings without knowing which dimension they are equals
in.75 Of course, one may understand ‘equal status’ to implicitly mean ‘equal status
in worth’ or ‘equal status in authority’, or ‘equals status in X other dimension’.
However, in doing so one implicitly either has a concept of Equal Worth, or Equal
Authority (or Equal X), but not a concept that includes all of them.76
Secondly, some concepts have the opposite problem: they are too thick. We grasp
them by reference to a contextual set of claims about our interwoven rights and
duties, or our abilities and values, which are present in our moral, political and legal
practices. The concepts of ‘equal dignity’ and ‘equal respect’ are good examples.
These concepts, however, are not basic at all. Instead, they encapsulate complex sets
of implications that we might believe are entailed by our basic equality. For this
reason, inevitably we gain any understanding of such concepts by analysing them as
operations upon the actual basic concepts of Equal Authority or Equal Worth (or
some combination of the two, see below). Kant is a perfect example. According to
Kant, our Equal Authority is basic, but in turn it provides ‘the ground of the dignity
of human nature and of every rational nature.’77 And equal respect, in turn, is simply
defined as the set of implications that follow from the ‘mere idea’ of dignity.78 And
in fact, when people dispute that Kant’s concepts of dignity and respect are not
grounded upon our Equal Authority, they argue instead that they are based on Equal
Worth.79 Either way, equal dignity and respect remain downriver from whatever the
actual source concept of basic equality is.
Finally, some concepts are composites: Vlastos’ ‘equal worth of the happiness
and freedom of all human beings’; Dworkin’s ‘equal concern and respect’; and,
Arneson’s ‘equal worth and dignity’, are example. These composites, however, are
clearly not themselves basic but instead are the combination of two putatively basic
concepts. And, in most cases they are merely combinations of Equal Worth and
Equal Authority, named under various synonyms, cognates, or ‘thicker’ derivative
notions (Worth qua happiness, concern and worth; Authority qua freedom, respect
and dignity). The problem with such composite concepts, therefore, is that they
paper over the conflicts and inconsistencies between their more basic elements. As
we argued above, the concepts of ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’ cannot both
75 Further, there is no way in which we could think of the claim that we must all have equal status as
somehow proven before and independently of the particular dimension in which we are equals. It would
be like claiming that a fundamental proposition about a square is that they all are equals in some
dimension. This is a true claim, but it only follows as an analytic corollary of the actual fundamental
proposition which is that are all equals in the four sides that they have.
76 I fail to see how this is solved by Waldron’s claim that we all have the same equal and high sortal
status, that is, the same set of rights and duties once reserved for the highest beings in our societies. This
still does not tell us in what dimension these beings were ‘high’ in the first place. See, Waldron (2011).
77 Kant (1996), 4:436. Otherwise put at 4:440, ‘the dignity of humanity consists just in the capacity to
give universal law, though with the condition of also being itself subject to this very lawgiving’.
78 Kant (1996), 4:439.
79 Eg., Rosen (2012).
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be truly basic to political thought, thus neither can the concept of ‘Equal Worth and
Authority’.
The Implications
But here we are met by the important question: Equals and unequals in what?
This is a difficult problem, and entails philosophical speculation in the field of
politics.
—Aristotle, Politics80
Berlin, somewhat artificially, welded his distinction between negative and positive
liberty onto the great contemporary ideological battle of his day: between Western,
democratic liberalism and Eastern, authoritarian communism. In this way, he drew
implications for the real-life politics of his day. I make no such grand claim for the
distinction between Equal Worth and Equal Authority. Undoubtedly, one might
argue that it roughly tracks the divide between peoples and nations who manifest
some form of great egalitarian, communal paternalism led by technocratic elites,
and those who retain messy, seemingly sclerotic democratic systems held together
(or held back) by mass politics. However, probably, more accurately the two
concepts are constantly confused, misused and conflated in all political systems.
My more modest claim is that, in the beginning at least, the distinction between
Equal Worth and Equal Authority has important implications for current debates
within contemporary political theory itself. In short, my call to arms can be summed
up in the demand that contemporary philosophers never again be allowed to claim
‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension
they claim that they are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else).
This is because it is upon this particular dimension that any argument culminating or
beginning with the proposition of basic equality will always turn.81
This will force philosophers to acknowledge whether they are relying upon either
the premises of Equal Worth or Equal Authority. It will force them to realise that
they may, without justification, be relying upon both at the same time. It will clarify
when two theories can clash because they presume the same concept of basic
equality, and when they are actually ships passing in the theoretical night. It will
also make clear what concept of basic equality philosophers are seeking to ground in
debates about the basis of basic equality.82 However, and most importantly, it will
80 Aristotle (1976), 86 [III 1282b].
81 Nor should they be excused the pseudo answers ‘status’, ‘recognition’, ‘rights’, ‘respect’, since they
only beg the further questions ‘status in what dimension’, ‘recognition of what property,’ ‘which rights’,
‘respect for what’. We cannot hope to complete the incomplete predicate of ‘equal X’, with simply further
predicates that are incomplete themselves. For this very reason, quite rightly, one should ask of the
answer ‘Equal Authority’ and ‘Equal Worth’, themselves, Equal Authority over what domain, ourselves
alone or our community as a whole? And, Equal Worth of what type of good, our good merely in general,
or what is good for our own sake? Only in this way, to clarify that someone is talking about the
democratic conception or the liberal conception, the equal value conception or the equal weight
conception.
82 For a survey of the debate, Waldron (2008).
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enable us to account for, confront and, perhaps, overcome the ‘Frustration’ many
philosophers face. As Enoch states:
I don’t know of any other philosophical discussion that is quite like this: Talk
to (broadly speaking) Rawlsians, and you are likely to get the impression that
some kind of political liberalism, or a public reason account, is the only game
in town. The only questions worth discussing, it seems, are within this
framework, rather than about it. Theorists who reject this framework are often
ignored, and the feeling one gets is that they just don’t get it. Talk to many
others, and you are likely to get the impression that Rawlsian public reason
has been effectively refuted several times over, and indeed, that even this
much was never necessary, as the theory was a non-starter to begin with. And
the feeling one gets is that Rawlsians just don’t get it, and that their
tremendous influence in political philosophy is corrupting the field.83
This problem has arisen, in part, because of the conflation of the two concepts of
Basic Equality. Both sides have, until now, believed that they were talking on the
same terms, and thus could never understand why they could not comprehend one
another. Now that these two concepts are separated we can see clearly where the
most pressing debate in current political philosophy was Aristotles’: what is the
most basic concept of equality? Let us now, finally, set about answering this
question.
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